This paper considers a sensor attack and fault detection problem for linear cyber-physical systems, which are subject to possibly non-Gaussian noise that can have an unknown light-tailed distribution. We propose a new thresholdbased detection mechanism that employs the Wasserstein metric, and which guarantees system performance with high confidence. The proposed detector may generate false alarms with a rate ∆ in normal operation, where ∆ can be tuned to be arbitrarily small by means of a benchmark distribution which is part of our mechanism. Thus, the proposed detector is sensitive to sensor attacks and faults which have a statistical behavior that is different from that of the system's noise. We quantify the impact of stealthy attacks-which aim to perturb the system operation while producing false alarms that are consistent with the natural system's noise-via a probabilistic reachable set. To enable tractable implementation of our methods, we propose a linear optimization problem that computes the proposed detection measure and a semidefinite program that produces the proposed reachable set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical processes that are tightly integrated with computation and communication systems for monitoring and control. Examples include critical infrastructure, such as transportation networks, energy distribution systems, and the Internet. These systems are usually complex, large-scale and insufficiently supervised, making them vulnerable to attacks [1] , [2] . A significant literature has studied various denial of service [3] , false data-injection [4] , [5] , replay [6] , [7] , sensor, and integrity attacks [8] - [11] . The majority of these works study attackdetection problems in a control-theoretical framework. This approach essentially employs detectors to identify abnormal behaviors by comparing estimation and measurements under some predefined metrics. However, attacks could be stealthy, and exploit knowledge of the system structure, uncertainty and noise information to inflict significant damage on the physical system before detection. This motivates the characterization of the impact of stealthy attacks via e.g. reachability set analysis [9] , [12] , [13] . To ensure computational tractability, these works assume either Gaussian or bounded system noise. More recently, novel measure of concentration has opened the way for distributionally robust attack detection with probability guarantees. A first work in this direction is [14] , where a Chebyshev inequality was used to design a detector and assess the impact of stealthy attacks, and under the assumption that system noise were bounded. Here, This research was developed with funding from ONR N00014-19-1-2471, and AFOSR FA9550-19-1-0235. 1 we aim to leverage a more general measure-concentration results for a less conservative detection mechanism design. In particular, we consider the following question for linear CPSs: How to design an attack-detection mechanism which is robust to (non-Gaussian) system noise while remaining sensitive to attacks, to limit the impact of the stealthy attack? Statement of Contributions: In this work, we consider a sensor-attack detection problem on a linear dynamical system. The linear system models a remotely-observed process that is subject to an additive noise described by an unknown, not-necessarily bounded, light-tailed distribution. To identify abnormal behavior, we propose a detection mechanism that employs a Luenberger observer as well as a benchmark distribution of an offline sequence corresponding to the normal system operation. The detection measure employs the Wasserstein distance between the benchmark and a distribution of the residual sequence obtained online. Then, our threshold-detection mechanism exploits measureof-concentration results to guarantee robust detection of an attack with high confidence, and further enable the robust tuning of the false alarm rate. The proposed detector can effectively identify the real-time attacks when its behavior differs from that of the system noise. Furthermore, we quantify the impact of stealthy attacker and system noise by upper-bounding the state-reachable set in a probabilistic manner. To implement and analyze the proposed mechanism, we formulate a linear optimization problem and a semidefinite problem for the computation of the detection measure as well as the reachable set, respectively. We illustrate our methods in a two-dimensional linear system with irregular noise distributions and stealthy sensor attacks.
II. CPS AND ITS NORMAL OPERATION
This section presents cyber-physical system (CPS) model, and underlying assumptions on the system and attacks.
A remotely-observed, cyber-physical system subject to sensor-measurement attacks, as in Fig. 1 , is described as a discrete-time, stochastic, linear, and time-invariant system
where x(t) ∈ R n , u(t) ∈ R m and y(t) ∈ R p denote the system state, input and output at time t ∈ N, respectively. The state matrix A, input matrix B and output matrix C are assumed to be known in advance. In particular, we assume that the pair (A, B) is stabilizable, and (A, C) is detectable. Furthermore, and w.l.o.g. we require that (1) is open-loop stable 1 , to reduce system vulnerability to attacks. The process noise w(t) ∈ R n and output noise v(t) ∈ R p are independent zero-mean random vectors. We assume that each w(t) and v(t) are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time, and ergodic. We denote their (unknown, not-necessarily equal) distributions by P w and P v , respectively. In addition, we assume that P w and P v are light-tailed 2 , excluding scenarios of systems operating under extreme events, or subject to large delays. In fact, Gaussian, Sub-Gaussian, Exponential distributions, and any distribution with a compact support set are admissible. This class of distributions is sufficient to characterize the uncertainty or noise of many practical problems. An additive sensor-measurement attack is implemented via γ(t) ∈ R p in (1), on which we assume the following Assumption II.1 (Attack model) It holds that 1) γ(t) = 0 p whenever there is no attack; 2) the attacker can modulate any component of γ(t) at any time; 3) the attacker has unlimited computational resources and access to system information, e.g., A, B, C, u, P w and P v to decide on γ(t), t ∈ N.
A. Normal System Operation
In what follows, we introduce the state observer that enables prediction in the absence of attacks (when γ(t) = 0). Since the distribution of system noise is unknown, we identify a benchmark distribution that can be used to characterize this unknown distribution with high confidence.
To predict (estimate) the system behavior, we leverage the system information (A, B, C) and employ a Luenberger observer
wherex(t) is the state estimate and L ≡ L(t) is the observer gain matrix. As the pair (A, C) is detectable, a Luenberger gain matrix L can be selected in such a way that the eigenvalues of the matrix A − LC are inside the unit circle. This ensures asymptotic tracking of the state in expectation; that is, the expectation of the estimation error e(t) := x(t) −x(t) satisfies E[e(t)] → 0 as t → ∞, for any x(0),x(0).
The further selection of eigenvalues of A−LC and the structure of L usually depends on additional control objectives such as noise attenuation requirements. In this paper, we additionally consider the estimated state feedback
where K is selected so that the following augmented system is (exponentially) stable
where
and some ξ(0).
Remark II.1 (Selection of L and K) In general, the selection of the matrices L and K for the system (1) is a nontrivial task, especially when certain performance criteria are to be satified, such as fast system response, energy conservation, or noise minimization. However, there are a few scenarios in which the Separation Principle can be invoked for a tractable design of L and K. For example, 1) when there is no system noise, matrices L and K can be designed separately, such that each A+BK and A−LC have all eigenvalues contained inside the unit circle, respectively.
2) when noise are Gaussian, the gain matrices L and K can be designed to minimize the steady-state covariance matrix and control effort, via a separated design of a Kalman filter (as an observer) and a linear-quadratic regulator (as a controller). The resulting design is referred to as a Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control [15] .
Consider the system initially operates normally with the proper selection of L and K, and assume that the augmented system (2) is in steady state, i.e., E[ξ(t)] = 0. In order to design an attack detector later, we need a characterization of the distribution of the residual r(t) ∈ R p , which measures the difference between what we measure and what we expect to receive, as follows
When there is no attack, it can be verified that the random vector r(t) is zero-mean, and light-tailed 3 , and we denote its unknown distribution by P r . We assume that a finite but large number N of i.i.d. samples of P r are accessible, and acquired by collecting r(t) for a sufficiently large time. We call these i.i.d. samples a benchmark data set,
, and construct the resulting empirical distribution P r,B by
where the operator δ is the mass function and the subscript B indicates that P r,B is the benchmark to approximate the unknown P r . We can claim that, the benchmark P r,B provides a good sense of the effect of the noise on the system (2) via the following measure concentration result Theorem II.1 (Measure Concentration [16, Application of Theorem 2]) If P r is a q-light-tailed distribution for some q ≥ 1, then for a given β ∈ (0, 1), the following holds
where Prob denotes the Probability, d W,q denotes the q-Wasserstein metric 4 in the probability space, and the parameter ǫ B is selected as
for some constant 5 a > q, c 1 , c 2 > 0, andǭ is such that
where p is the dimension of r.
Theorem II.1 provides a probabilistic bound ǫ B on the q-Wasserstein distance between P r,B and P r , with a confidence at least 1 − β. The result indicates how to tune the parameter β and the number of benchmark samples N that are needed to find a sufficiently good approximation of P r , by means of P r,B . In this way, given a fixed ǫ, we can increase our confidence (1 − β) on whether P r and P r,B are within distance ǫ, by increasing the number of samples. We assume that P r,B has been determined in advance, selecting a very large (unique) N to ensure various very small bounds ǫ B associated with various β. Later, we discuss how the parameter β can be interpreted as a false alarm rate in the proposed attack detector. The resulting P r,B , with a tunnable false alarm rate (depending on β), will allow us to design a detection procedure which is robust to the system noise.
III. THRESHOLD-BASED ROBUST DETECTION OF

ATTACKS, AND STEALTHINESS
This section presents our online detection procedure, and a threshold-based detector with high-confidence performance guarantees. Then, we propose a tractable computation of the detection measure used for online detection. We finish the section by introducing to a class of stealthy attacks. 4 Let Mq(Z) denote the space of all q-light-tailed probability distributions supported on Z ⊂ R p . Then for any two distributions Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Mq(Z), the q-Wasserstein metric [17] 
where Π is in a set of all the probability distributions on Z × Z with marginals Q 1 and Q 2 . The cost ℓ(ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) := ξ 1 − ξ 2 is a norm on Z. 5 The parameter a is determined as in the definition of Pr and the constants c 1 , c 2 depend on q, m, and Pr (via a, b, c). When information on Pr is absent, the parameters a, c 1 and c 2 can be determined in a data-driven fashion using sufficiently many samples of Pr. See [16] for details.
Online Detection Procedure (ODP): At each time t ≥ T , we construct a T -step detector distribution
where r(t − j) is the residue data collected independently at time t − j, for j ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Then with a given q and a threshold α > 0, we consider the detection measure
and the attack detector
with Alarm(t) the sequence of alarms generated online based on the previous threshold. The distribution P r,D uses a small number T of samples to ensure the online computational tractability of z(t), so P r,D is highly dependent on instantaneous samples. Thus, P r,D may significantly deviate from the true P r , and from P r,B . Therefore, even if there is no attack, the attack detector is expected to generate false alarms due to the system noise as well as an improper selection of the threshold α. In the following, we discuss how to select an α that is robust to the system noise and which results in a desired false alarm rate. Note that the value α should be small to be able to distinguish attacks from noise, as discussed later.
Lemma III.1 (Selection of α for Robust Detectors) Given parameters N , T , q, β, and a desired false alarm rate ∆ > β at time t, if we select the threshold α as
where ǫ B is chosen as in (3) and ǫ D is selected following the ǫ B -formula (3), but with T and ∆−β 1−β in place of N and β, respectively. Then, the detection measure (4) satisfies
for any zero-mean q-light-tailed underlying distribution P r .
Proof: The proof leverages the triangular inequality
the measure concentration result for each d W,q term, and that samples of P r,B and P r,D are collected independently.
Lemma III.1 ensures that the false alarm rate is no higher than ∆ when there is no attack, i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 1 | no attack) ≤ ∆, ∀ t.
Note that the rate ∆ can be selected by properly choosing the threshold α. Intuitively, if we fix all the other parameters, then the smaller the rate ∆, the larger the threshold α. Also, large values of N , T , 1 − β contribute to small α. Computation of detection measure: To achieve a tractable computation of the detection measure z(t), we leverage the definition of the Wasserstein distance (see footnote 4) and the fact that both P r,B and P r,D are discrete. The solution is given as a linear program.
The Wasserstein distance d W,q (P r,B , P r,D ), originally solving the Kantorovich optimal transport problem [17] , can be interpreted as the minimal work needed to move a mass of points described via a probability distribution P r,B (r), on the space Z ⊂ R p , to a mass of points described by the probability distribution P r,D (r) on the same space, with some transportation cost ℓ. The minimization that defines d W,q is taken over the space of all the joint distributions Π on Z × Z whose marginals are P r,B and P r,D , respectively.
Assuming that both P r,B and P r,D are discrete, we can equivalently characterize the joint distribution Π as a discrete mass optimal transportation plan [17] . To do this, let us consider two sets N := {1, . . . , N } and T := {0, . . . , T − 1}. Then, Π can be parameterized (by λ) as follows
Note that this characterizes all the joint distributions with marginals P r,B and P r,D , where λ is the allocation of the mass from P r,B to P r,D . Then, the proposed detection measure z(t) in (4) reduces to the following
which is a linear program over a compact polyhedral set. Therefore, the solution exists and (P) can be solved to global optimal in polynomial time by e.g., a CPLEX solver.
A. Detection and Stealthiness of Attacks
Following from the previous discussion, we now introduce a False Alarm Quantification Problem, then specialize it to the Attack Detection Problem considered in this paper. In particular, we analyze the sensitivity of the proposed attack detector method for the cyber-physical system under attacks. Problem 1. (False Alarm Quantification Problem): Given the steady state cyber-physical system (the augmented setting of (2)), the online detection procedure in Section III, and the attacker type described in Assumption II.1, compute the false alarm rate Prob(false alarm at t) := Prob(Alarm(t) = 1 | no attack) Prob(no attack) + Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) Prob(attack).
Problem 1, on the computation of the false alarm probability, requires prior information of the attack probability Prob(attack). In this work, we are interested in stealthy attacks, i.e., attacks that cannot be effectively detected by (5) .
We are led to the following problem. Problem 2. (Attack Detection Problem): Given the setting of Problem 1, provide conditions that characterize stealthy attacks, i.e., attacks that contribute to Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack), and quantify their impact on the system. To remain undetected, the attacker must select γ(t) such that the detection measure z(t) is limited to within the threshold α. To quantify the effects of these attacks, let us consider an attacker sequence backward in time with length T . At time t, denote the arbitrary injected attacker sequence by
. This sequence, together with (2), results in a detection sequence {r(t − j)} j that can be used to construct detector distribution P r,D and detection measure z(t). For simplicity and w.l.o.g., let us assume that γ(t) is in the following form
whereγ(t) ∈ R p is any vector selected by the attacker. We characterize the scenarios that can occur, providing a first, partial answer to Problem 2. Then, we will come back to characterizing the impact of stealthy attacks in Section IV.
Definition III.1 (Attack Detection Characterization) Assume (2) is subject to attack, i.e., γ(t) = 0 for some t ≥ 0.
• If z(t) ≤ α, ∀ t ≥ 0, then the attack is stealthy with probability one, i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) = 1. • If z(t) ≤ α, ∀t ≤ M , then the attack is M -step stealthy. • If z(t) > α, ∀t ≥ 0, then the attack is active with probability one, i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) = 0.
Lemma III.2 (Stealthy Attacks Leveraging System Noise)
Assume (2) is subject to attack in form (8) , whereγ(t) is stochastic and distributed as Pγ. If Pγ is selected such that d W,q (Pγ, P r,B ) ≤ ǫ B , then the attacker is stealthy with (high) probability at least 1−∆ 1−β , i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) ≥ 1−∆ 1−β . Proof: Assume (2) is under attack. Then, we prove the statement leveraging the measure concentration
which holds as P r,D is in fact constructed using samples of Pγ, and the triangular inequality
resulting in z(t) ≤ α with probability at least 1−∆ 1−β .
IV. STEALTHY ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this section, we address the second question in Problem 2 via reachable-set analysis. In particular, we achieve an outer-approximation of the finite-step probabilistic reachable set, quantifying the effect of the stealthy attacks and the system noise in probability.
Consider an attack sequence γ(t) as in (8), whereγ(t) ∈ R p is any vector such that the attack remains stealthy. That is, γ(t) results in the detected distribution P r,D , which is close to P r,B as prescribed by α. This results in the following representation of the system (2)
. (9) Note that we require (1) to be stable, which ensures the observer is able to track system states under sensor attacks. By means of the proposed detection strategy, the selection of a stealthyγ(t) becomes nontrivial. To give an intuition about this, we provide a simple example in the following remark.
Remark IV.1 (Constant attacks) Consider a constant attack γ(t) := γ 0 for some γ 0 ∈ R p , ∀t. Then by (P),
To ensure stealth, we require z(t) ≤ α, this then limits the selection of γ 0 in a ball centered at C(Ξ B ) with radius α/N 1−1/q . Note that the radius can be arbitrarily small by choosing the benchmark size N large.
To quantify the reachable set of the system under attacks, prior information on the process noise w(t) is needed. To characterize w(t), let us assume that, similarly to the benchmark P r,B , we are able to construct a noise benchmark distribution, denoted by P w,B . As before,
for some ǫ w,B . Given certain time, we are interested in where, with high probability, the state of the system can evolve from some ξ 0 . To do this, we consider the M -step probabilistic reachable set defined as follows where 1 − β accounts for the independent restriction of the unknown distributions P w to be "close" to its benchmark.
The exact computation of R x,M is intractable due to the unbounded support of the unknown distributions P w and Pγ, even if they are close to their benchmark. To ensure a tractable approximation, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we equivalently characterize the constraints on P by its probabilistic support set. Then, we outer-approximate the probabilistic support by ellipsoids, and then the reachable set by an ellipsoidal bound.
Step 1: (Probabilistic Support of Pγ ∋ d W,q (Pγ, P r,B ) ≤ α) We achieve this by leveraging 1) the Monge formulation [17] of optimal transport, 2) the fact that P r,B is discrete, and 3) results from coverage control [18] , [19] . W.l.o.g., let us assume Pγ is non-atomic (or continuous) and, consider the distribution Pγ and P r,B supported on Z ⊂ R p . Let us denote by f : Pγ → P r,B the transport map that assigns mass over Z from Pγ to P r,B . The Monge formulation of optimal transport aims to find an optimal transport map that minimizes the transportation cost ℓ as follows
It is known that if an optimal transport map f ⋆ exists, then the optimal transportation plan Π ⋆ exists and the two problems d M,q and d W,q coincide 6 . In our setting, for strongly convex ℓ p , and by the fact that Pγ is absolutely continuous, a unique optimal transport map can indeed be guaranteed 7 , and therefore, d M,q = d W,q . Let us now consider any transport map f of d M,q , and define a partition of the support of Pγ by
where r (i) are samples in Ξ B , which generate P r,B . Then, we equivalently rewrite the value of the objective function defined in d M,q , as
where the i th constraints come from the fact that a transport map f should lead to consistent calculation of set volumes under P r,B and Pγ, respectively. This results in the following equivalent problem to d M,q as 
Given the distribution Pγ, Problem (P1) reduces to a loadbalancing problem as in [19] . Let us define the Generalized Voronoi Partition (GVP) of Z associated to the sample set Ξ B and weight ω ∈ R N , for all i ∈ N , as
It has been established that the optimal Partition of (P1) is the GVP [19, Proposition V.1]. Further, the standard Voronoi partition, i.e., the GVP with equal weightsω := 0 p , results in a lower boundof (P1), when constraints (10) are removed [18] , and therefore that of d M,q . We denote this lower bound as L(Pγ, V(Ξ B )), and use this to quantify a probabilistic support of Pγ. Let us consider the support set
where B ǫ (r (i) ) := {r ∈ R p | r − r (i) ≤ ǫ}. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma IV.1 (Probabilistic Support) Let ǫ > 0 and let Pγ be a distribution such that L(Pγ, V(Ξ B )) ≤ ǫ q . Then, at least 1 − 1/2 q portion of the mass of Pγ is supported on Ω(Ξ B , 2ǫ), i.e., Ω(ΞB,2ǫ) Pγ(ξ)dξ ≥ 1 − 1/2 q .
Proof: Suppose otherwise, then
In this way, the support Ω(Ξ B , 2α) contains at least 1 − 1/2 q of the mass of all the distributions Pγ such that d W,q (Pγ, P r,B ) ≤ α. Equivalently, we have
where the random variableγ has a distribution Pγ such that d W,q (Pγ, P r,B ) ≤ α. We characterize P w similarly. Note that in practice, one can choose ball radius ǫ large in order to generate support which contains higher portion of the mass of unknown P. However, it comes at a cost on the approximation of the reachable set.
Step 2: (Outer-approximation of R x,M ) Making use of the probabilistic support, we can now obtain a finite-dimensional characterization of the probabilistic reachable set, as follows
Many works focus on the tractable evolution of geometric shapes; e.g. [9] , [13] , [20] . Here, we follow [13] , [20] and propose outer ellipsoidal bounds for R x,M . Let Q w be the positivedefinite shape matrix such that Ω(Ξ w,B , ǫ w,B ) ⊂ E w := {w | w ⊤ Q w w ≤ 1}. Similarly, we denote Qγ and Eγ for that ofγ. We now state the following lemma, that applies [13, Proposition 1] for our case.
where H, G are that in (9) and
for some a 1 + a 2 ≥ a, a 1 , a 2 ∈ [0, 1). 
which is a convex semidefinite program, solvable via e.g., SeDuMi [21] . Note that the probabilistic reachable set is
which again can be approximated via Q ⋆ solving (P2) for 8
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed attack detector, illustrating its distributional robustness w.r.t. the system noise. Then, we consider stealthy attacks as in (8) and analyze their impact by quantifying the probabilistic reachable set and outer-approximation bound. Consider the stochastic system (2), given as where N and U represent the normal and uniform distributions, respectively. We consider N = 10 3 benchmark samples for P r,B and T = 10 2 real-time samples for P r,D . We select the parameter q = 1, β = 0.01 and false alarm rate ∆ = 0.05. We select the prior information of the system noise via parameters a = 1.5, c 1 = 1.84×10 6 and c 2 = 12.5.
Using the measure-of-concentration results, we determine the detector threshold to be α = 0.158. In the normal system operation (no attack), we run the online detection procedure for 10 4 time steps and draw the distribution of the computed detection measure z(t) as in Fig. 2 . We verify that the false alarm rate is 3.68%, within the required rate ∆ = 5%. When the system is subject to stealthy attacks, we assume ξ 0 = 0 2n and visualize the Voronoi partition V(Ξ w,B ) (convex sets with blue boundaries) of the probabilistic support Ω(Ξ w,B , ǫ w,B ) and its estimated ellipsoidal bound (red line) as in Fig. 3 . Further, we demonstrate the impact of the stealthy attacks (8) , as in Fig. 4 . We used 10 4 empirical points of R x as its estimate and provided an ellipsoidal bound of R x computed by solution of (P2). It can be seen that the proposed probabilistic reachable set effectively captures the reachable set in probability. We omit the comparison of our approach to the existing ones, such as the classical χ 2 detector and the CUMSUM procedure, for future work. However, the difference should be clear: our proposed approach is robust w.r.t. noise distributions while others leverage the moment information up to the second order, which only capture sufficient information about certain noise distributions, e.g., Gaussian.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A novel detection measure was proposed to enable distributionally robust detection of attacks w.r.t. unknown, and light-tailed system noise. The proposed detection measure restricts the behavior of the stealthy attacks, whose impact 8 The set Rx is in fact contained in the projection of E(Q ⋆ ) onto the state subspace, i.e., Rx ⊂ {x | x ⊤ Qxx − QxeQ −1 ee Qxe ⊤ x ≤ (2−a) 1−a } with Q ⋆ := Qxx Qxe Qxe ⊤ Qee . See, e.g., [13] for details. Fig. 2 : Statistics of z. Fig. 3 : Probabilistic Support of Pw. Fig. 4 : Empirical and Bound of Rx.
was quantified via reachable-set analysis. Future work will focus on more extensive comparision of the proposed approach with other methods under various types of attacks.
